To what extent is amorality angry

Theoretical foundations of the research area

Ethics and Entrepreneurship pp 11-321 | Cite as

abstract

The discussion and treatment of normative problems in science is already a philosophical legacy of antiquity, which has been dealt with into modern times.41 In particular, philosophical ethics, with its diverse currents and normative implications, is the theoretical frame of reference up to the present day scientific work in different scientific disciplines for the treatment of ethics and ethical issues.

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literature

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