What is necessary for a comprehensive worldview

Origin, necessity and change of the worldview

structure

1 Introduction

2. Basic considerations
2.1 Dilthey: The types of worldview
2.2 Scheler: Philosophical Weltanschauung
2.3 Schiller and Kant excursus

3. Weber: Rationalization Processes and Change of World View

4. Rohbeck: Cultural Effects of Technology

5. Summary and conclusion

6. Bibliography

1 Introduction

The investigation of the term world view can be approached from many perspectives, historical, sociological, compatibilistic, cultural, functionalistic etc. Here v. a. consider the anthropological conditions resulting from the need to develop a certain perspective on the world, which factors are involved and how world views have changed under different conditions. “They determine [human] self-understanding in a comprehensive form, shape the organization of its immediate social relationships, establish certain images of the state and society, give history a unified meaning and, as a rule, also represent cosmic designs So here v. a. be asked about man's relationship to the world. The question of the meaningfulness and meaning for humans will be asked again and again, since it represents a central moment in the explanation of the world. To this end, points of view from different perspectives are given. For the work, Dilthey's remarks should fundamentally show which human factors are involved in their relationship and interpretation to the world and what a worldview achieves (by the way, the term worldview, which has negative connotations, should not be problematized here; rather, if it is used, it should be understood as it is its neutral denotation). Scheler will also give interesting aspects of the necessity of the world view and the path to metaphysical intuition. As a starting point, a text by Schiller will be the starting point for bringing the two studies together and referring to Weber, whose theory of disenchantment will be presented below. Finally, it should be considered what the worldview of technical modernity looks like and to what extent it still enables meaning or a comprehensive interpretation of the world.1

2. Basic considerations

2.1 Dilthey: The types of worldview

According to Dilthey, a worldview results - in short - from the psychological totality and its relationships to the world and life in the constant attempt to solve the "riddle of life".2 “From the life behavior, the life experience, the structure of our psychic totality emerge [the world views]. The elevation of life to consciousness in the knowledge of reality, appreciation of life and the performance of will is the slow and difficult work that mankind has developed in the development of views of life. "3 With the psychic totality a holistic experience is meant, i. H. Thinking as knowing, feeling as evaluating and wanting as a need for action, which is felt as uncertainty and contradictions in view of the phenomena to be found. This “riddle of life” consists more precisely in the omnipresent pastness of all phenomena, which contradicts the mental striving for “inner stability” in the sense of imperishability, necessity and universality.4 What is known in the world, which is reflected in the "world view" (which in turn is based on abstracting and theorizing phenomena

Forms relationships)5 and summarizes life experiences are more strictly formulated against the emotional evaluation ("appreciation of life") of the known as positive / useful or negative / harmful and the anthropologically fundamental will for inner stability: omnipresent pastness, the desire for immortality, superiority of nature, the desire for independence and the known Limitation goes against the desire for freedom.6 Because of this powerlessness of the field of tension, a universal scale of values ​​or an ideal of life is sought7that is relatively stable in relation to the physical world, creates orientation and meaning in the life plan. This results in a view of life and the world view. The solution of the riddle of life succeeds through the comparison.

The incomprehensible supersensible is compared with the comprehensible sensual, for example through personifications, symbols or concepts. This makes it possible to infer meaning and meaning (of human beings) in the world.8 Thus, a meaningful life plan can be developed.

Dilthey clarifies the solution of the riddle of life on the basis of the religious worldview: the perceived or also factual (natural) superiority is interpreted as an effective power, even as personal power9. Thus the world and the life in it are understood as divine and worked through. The life plan is given an orientation that is related to God and becomes meaningful through religious rites, cult acts, etc. Similar mechanisms can be found in metaphysical world views, which create meaning of life through the search for ultimate purposes, first causes behind the sensual and the essential.1011

2.2 Scheler: Philosophical Weltanschauung

Scheler gives some hints how a metaphysical world view is possible. In doing so, he marks positivist approaches that derive their knowledge only from sensual perceptions, or historicalist positions such as that of Dilthey, which sees worldviews as “only changeable forms of expression for changing historical and social situations” as outdated.

According to Scheler, world views of individuals arise from religious or other traditions, through education and socialization. Why or whether there are and were differences specific to epochs, cultures, cohorts etc. seems to interest him less. Even if world views are accounted for as relatively unreflected by him, he admits that certain philosophical insights, metaphysical influences always had on world views. What is remarkable in his text, however, is that it is stated that humans have no decision-making ability to form a metaphysical idea or feeling. On the contrary: he necessarily has such an idea (unconsciously or consciously, through his own acquisition or through tradition).12 The only choice he can make is between good and reasonable or bad and unreasonable idea of ​​the absolute. "Having the sphere of an absolute being in front of one's thinking consciousness is part of the essence of human beings and forms an intangible structure with self-consciousness, world consciousness, language and conscience."13 Even if a person is looking for a substitute in a sensual orientation, the sphere of the absolute still intentionally consists (in this), but without content. The sphere can also be enriched with finite things such as money, nation, people, quasi as an “as if absolute”, but that is fetishism and idolatry. The relativization of such idols is a basic prerequisite for thinking about the absolute.14 In the following, Scheler shows three types of knowledge to be recognized, whereby the third and metaphysical type of knowledge (and thus a world view of the absolute) consists in "gaining a living share in the basis of things in the core of one's person."15 The first way consists in knowledge of domination or achievement, the second in essential or educational knowledge and the third in metaphysical or salvation knowledge.

The knowledge of domination or achievement is the knowledge of the positive sciences, which seeks the laws of phenomena to rule the world. It is to be understood analogously to the senses for the regulation of drives and needs.16 The essential knowledge disregards contingencies or real beings and asks what living beings and bodies are and what their essence is. The main focus is on essential "properties" that are sought a priori through knowledge of reason.17 The metaphysical knowledge seeks the highest ground of all things. According to Scheler, between the metaphysics of borderline problems and the absolute lies the access that people have to knowledge of the absolute: philosophical anthropology.18 Here, from the character of the human being, the highest ground of all things is inferred. This is possible through the structural analogy or the essential connections between things and human approaches (such as mental acts and the regions of being).

That is why all of the files and operations that give us access to it can be ascribed to the reason of all things. So we can relate the realms of being, which are independent of our existence, to a supersingular mind, which must be an attribute of the primal.1920 The microcosm of man represents, so to speak, in parts the macrocosm, the human spirit corresponds to the essential structure of the objective world. “And that is why the human being as microtheos is also the first access to God.” 20 Access to God consists in the participation or the co-execution of the eternal act. "Since the individual person of every human being is directly rooted in eternal being and spirit, there is no universally valid, but only an individually valid, and at the same time historically conditioned 'content' worldview in the mafi of its perfection and adequation. There is, however, a strictly general method according to which every person - whoever it is - can find 'his' metaphysical truth. "21

2.3 Schiller and Kant excursus

Based on the Schiller text, From the sublime. For the further execution of some of Kant's ideas ",22 which actually uses Kantian ideas within a drama-theoretical consideration, both approaches outlined so far are to be brought together and viewed from a functional perspective in order to describe the anthropological necessity of a (metaphysical) world view and its theoretical conditions of development (also with regard to Weber's world view theory).

Based on a number of anthropological views (such as Spinoza, for example), Schiller fundamentally differentiates between two human drives: the drive for self-preservation and a drive for action and imagination, respectively. Drive to change. The former belongs to the sensual physical world, i.e. existence, the latter to the realm of ideas and knowledge. These instincts are always dependent on “nature” and become visible when they cannot agree with it. The existential drive can be felt as pain or similar when the conditions are reduced or absent in order to maintain our existence, and the imaginary drive, depending on the influence of the first drive, becomes insecure or fear, if analogous conditions for gaining knowledge are absent or difficult. Reason succeeds in gaining a twofold independence from this twofold dependence: Man can think more than he can recognize (the sublime of knowledge; in Kant: mathematically sublime) and, secondly, he can contradict his desires with his will (sublime the disposition, the practical, in Kant: dynamically sublime). The objects of the instincts (objects of sensation and knowledge) are thus in contradiction with the instinct. But only as sense beings do we depend on nature. Natural forces can affect us as sensual physical beings, but they have no influence on the part that is not subject to natural law, the will. (325) The elevation above the powers of nature is thus possible through the spiritual sphere, at the same time and precisely for this reason that means for the physical and sensual part all the more to notice the dependence on nature. This is the contradiction that Dilthey has already described, between the will and the known reality of life. To resolve the contradiction, man also practically rises:

“The irresistible power of nature, says Kant, allows us, viewed as sensory beings, to recognize our impotence, but at the same time discovers in us a capacity to judge ourselves as independent of it and a superiority over nature, which leads to a self-preservation of is of a completely different kind than that which can be challenged and endangered by nature outside of us - while humanity remains undegraded in our person, although human beings had to be subject to violence. In such a way - he continues - the terrible power of nature is judged aesthetically by us as sublime, because it calls upon our power, which is not nature, in us for all that we are concerned about as sense beings, good, health and life, to be regarded as small, and therefore also that power of nature - to which we are, however, subject with regard to these goods - for us and our personalities nevertheless not to be regarded as a force to which we had to bow if it was based on our highest principles and whose assertion or abandonment arrived.

[...]



1 Demmerling, Christoph: Why philosophy is not a worldview. In: Rohbeck, Johannes (Ed.): Philosophy and Weltanschauung. Dresden: Thelem 2000 (= Dresdner Hefte fur Philosophie; 1), p. 15f.

2 Cf. Dilthey, Wilhelm: Die types der Weltanschauung. In: Fresisen-Kohler, Max (Red.): Weltanschauung. Philosophy and religion in representations v. W. Dilthey, B. Groethuysen [et al.], Berlin: Reichl 1911, pp. 9-15.

3 Dilthey, Wilhelm: “Doctrine of Weltanschauung. Treatises on the philosophy of philosophy. In: ders .: Collected writings. Vol. 8 ed. v. Groethuysen, Bernhard: Leipzig [among others]: Teubner 1931, p. 86.

4 See (as note 2), p. 8f. and 14-16.

5 See ibid., P. 12

6 See ibid., Pp. 14-16.

7 See ibid., Pp. 11-13

8 See ibid., P. 11.

9 See ibid., Pp. 18-21.

10 See ibid., Pp. 25-28.

11 Scheler, Max: Philosophical Weltanschauung. Munchen: Lehnen 1954, p. 6.

12 See ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 See ibid., P. 7.

15 Ibid., P. 7.

16 See ibid., P. 9.

17 See ibid., Pp. 9-11.

18 See ibid., P. 12

19 See ibid., P. 14.

20 Ibid., P. 14.

21 Ibid., P. 15.

22 Friedrich Schiller: Complete Works, Volume 5, Munchen: Hanser 31962, pp. 489-513. Source: http://www.zeno.org/nid/2000560981X (December 29, 2010).

End of the reading sample from 25 pages